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ABSTRACT
From the lessons learned from past earthquakes, it is noticed that modern embankment dams withstand the design earthquake
without significant damages. In spite of this scenario it is important to prevent the occurrence of incidents and accidents of
embankment dams during the earthquakes and so a deep understanding of the triggering factors is important. Well documents case
histories from many parts of the world related embankment dams behaviour during recent earthquakes were carefully selected and
are discussed. Based in the governed factors attention is given to the requirements for materials characterization, modelling,
analysis, monitoring and safety evaluation. Ageing effects and rehabilitation of dams are analysed. The risks associated with dam
projects are discussed. The benefits and concerns of dams are presented. It is important to develop new ways of thinking and
strategies to address the future challenges.

I am very busy
I have already begun with my survey
And I began to write my next error.
Bertolt Brecht
INTRODUCTION
From a careful study of dam behavior during earthquakes
occurrences the failure mechanisms are presented. Well
documents case histories from many parts of the world
related embankment dam behaviour during recent
earthquakes were carefully selected and are discussed. The
background of earthquake embankment dam engineering
history is presented.
The seismic design and the analysis of dam stability during
earthquakes are addressed. The reservoir triggered
earthquakes and the causative factors are discussed. Dam
monitoring and inspections of dams after earthquakes are
presented. Ageing effects and rehabilitation of dams are
analysed.
The risks associated with dam projects are discussed. The
benefits and concerns of dams are presented. Some topics
that deserved more consideration are introduced.

LESSONS
FROM
EMBANKMENT
PERFORMANCE DURING EARTHQUAKES

DAM

From a careful study of dam behavior during earthquakes
occurrences the following failure mechanisms can be selected
(Sêco e Pinto, 2001):
Sliding or shear distortion of embankment or foundation or
both;
Transverse cracks;
Longitudinal cracks;
Unacceptable seepage;
Liquefaction of dam body or foundation;
Loss of freeboard due to compaction of embankment or
foundation;
Rupture of underground conduits;
Overtopping due to seiches in reservoir;
Overtopping due to slides or rockfalls into reservoir;
Damages to waterproofing systems in upstream face;
Settlements and differential settlements;
Slab displacements;
Change of water level due fracture of grout curtain;
Movements on faults under or adjacent to dam.
A survey of dams behaviour during earthquakes carefully
selected is presented in Annex 1.
Some interesting case histories are discussed subsequently,
in order to absorb the lessons learned.
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One of the early reports related with the behaviour of
embankment dams during the occurrence of seismic effects
describes the Sheffield Dam failure occurred during an
earthquake near Santa Barbara, California in June 29, 1925.
The dam was constructed in the winter of 1917 with 219.50 m
long and 76 m high. The body of the dam was composed of
silty sand and sandy silt containing some cobbles and boulders,
but the upstream slope was faced with a 1.20m thick clay
blanket. No records of the degree of compaction are available
but it was probably about 75 to 80 percent based on the
standard AASHO compaction test (ICOLD, 1975).
The foundation soil consisted of a layer of terrace alluvium
1.20 to 3m thick, overlying sandstone bedrock.
There were no strong-motion instruments in existence at the
time but on the basis of records obtained at distant stations, the
earthquake has been assigned a magnitude of 6.3 with an
epicenter located about 11.2 km north west of the dam site.

Fig.1 –San Fernando dam-dam view

Lessons 1: Embankment dams with low degree of
compaction are vulnerable to earthquakes.
During San Fernando earthquake, M= 6.6, February 9, 1971
a major slide has occurred in the upstream slope of the
Lower San Fernando Dam.
Figs. 1 and 2 show dam views after the earthquake.
The dam was initiated by hydraulic fill method, with
additional zones of compacted fill being added later. The
slides movements were due an increase in pore pressure in
the embankment due ground shaking with a loss of strength
and liquefaction of the hydraulic fill (Seed et al, 1973).

Fig.2 –San Fernando dam –upstream slope slide

Lesson 2: Hydraulic fills due the development of pore
pressure are susceptible to liquefaction.
Oroville dam with 1707 m long and 235 m high was built in
1968 (Banerjee et al, 1979). The dam cross section is shown
in Fig. 3. The dam has suffered August, 1, 1975 Oroville
earthquake with 5.7 magnitude and has exhibited crest
settlements of 9 mm and horizontal displacements of 15 mm.
The conventional pseudo-static analysis with a seismic
coefficient of 0.1 g was performed during the design stage.
The Oroville earthquake disclose the existence of a
previously unidentified fault in the vicinity of the dam. Due
the concerns related the occurrence of a 6.5 magnitude
earthquake with a hypocentral less than 8.5 km from the dam
2D and 3D finite element analyses were performed.
Lesson 3: Rockfill dams with compacted material exhibits a
good behaviour during the occurrence of earthquakes. To
correct simulate the dynamic resoponse of dams in steep
triangular canyons a three-dimensional analysis is needed.

Fig.3 –Oroville dam cross section (after Banerjee et al,
1979).
High Aswan Dam (HAD) is a rockfill dam with clay core,
rockfills shells and a wide grout curtain from the bottom of
the clay to rock formation (Fig. 4). It is 111 m high and 3600
m long, the storage capacity is 162 km3 and is built on main
river Nile (Shenouda, 1982).
For the design purposes it was considered that Aswan area
was not seismic.
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(9) Three layer filter.
(10) Drainage wells.
(11) D.S. prisms of fines.
(12) Protective layer of big blocks.
(13) Inspection galleries.
(14) Sluicing limits.

(1) Rockfill of muck.
(2) Sized stones sluiced with sand.
(3) Sized stones sluiced with silt and clay
(4, 4’) Dune sand.
(5) Coarse sand.
(6, 7) Clay core and blanket.
(8) Grout curtain.

Fig.4 Cross section of dam (after Shenouda, 1982)
On 14 November 1981 a moderate earthquake of magnitude
5.3 occurred about 5,3 km Southwest of the dam. The
sudden occurrence of this earthquake caused a significant
concern due to the concentration of population in the valley
and along downstream the dam. The evaluation of fault
capability of releasing earthquakes in the Aswan area
became a high priority problem (Shalaby, 1995).

acceleration value of 0.25g. No damages were observed in
the gallery (Benlala, 2003).
Lesson 5: Well designed and constructed embankment dams
exhibit a good behaviour for strong ground motions.

High-gain seismographs and also a network of six portable
seismographs surrounding the after shock zone were
installed.
On July 1982 a telemeter network was installed.
The seismic monitoring and the telemetered network have
shown a close association between the Kalabsha fault and
the main shock of November 1981 and much of the
subsequent local seismicity. It was also concluded that the
risk of reservoir triggered seismicity was insignificant.
Seismic stability and potential deformations were assessed
by a non linear finite element analysis. The results of the
studies show that the occurrence of the largest potential
earthquake would not jeopardize the safety and integrity of
the dam and its appurtenant structures.

Fig .5 Keddara dam-downstream view

Lesson 4: The identification of tectonic mechanisms,
location and description of faults and estimation of fault
activity play an important role to assess the involved dam
risk.
On May 2003 an earthquake of magnitude 6.8, with a depth
of 10 km, occurred 40 km East Alger, provoking 2270
deaths. In Keddara rockfill dam, with 106m high (Fig. 5),
located 30 km from the fault, only 1 longitudinal crack and 3
transverse cracks were observed (Fig.6). A value of 0.34 g
was recorded in rock and the dam was designed for a
Fig. 6. Keddara dam-cracks observed at the crest
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Matahina Dam is a rockfill embankment 80 m high, with a
central core located in New Zealand.
The dam has leaked after first filling in 1967 due to core
cracking, and was consequently repaired. In 1987 the dam
was exposed to strong seismic shaking (peak horizontal crest
acceleration 0.42g) due to M=6.3 earthquake, located at the
Edgecumbe fault.
The dam is sited across the Waiohau active fault, 80 km
long, with proven surface breaking during the Holocene.
For the dam safety evaluation and earthquake with M= 7.2
was selected considering the surface rupture of Waiohau
fault, crossing the dam site. The value of 3.0 m in oblique
was thus selected for the fault surface displacement as 2:1
(i.e. 2.7 m horizontal and 1.3 m vertical displacement). Such
displacements would result in major cracking of the dam
body inducing piping and internal erosion, as observed
during the 1987 Edgecumbe earthquake.

Fig.8. Yamamoto dam profile (after Matsumoto, 2006)

The proposed strengthening is shown in Fig. 7 and consists
in excavating significant part of the downstream shoulder
and on keeping the existing core. The post SEE leakage
control is to be ensured by placing a wide zone of filter,
transition and drainage materials with 5.0 m minimum of
thickness. The new crest will be approximately 40 m with
the crest being heightened by 3.0 m to accommodate any
settlement due to shaking and maintain sufficient freeboard
(ICOLD, 1999).
Lesson 6: Due the re-evaluation of design seismic action
there is a need to strength the dams in order to accommodate
the settlements and leakage.
A typical cross section of New Yamamoto dam, 42 m high,
built in 1990 composed by shell materials, filter and clay
core is shown in Fig. 8.
During the occurrence of Niigata earthquake 2004, the dam
settled 0.8 m, i.e, 2%.. The following situations have
occurred contamination of drain, liquefaction of the
upstream and settlements. A pond at dam crest has occurred
(Fig. 9), but the overall behaviour of the dam was
satisfactory to retain the water (Matsumoto, 2006).

Fig. 9. Pond at dam crest (after Matsumoto, 2006)
Lesson 7: In spite of some high settlements that occurred
during earthquakes the embankment dams still accomplish
their function.
Aramos dam with 42 m high and 220 m long is located in
Chile. The dam profile shown in Fig 10 has a core with fine
soils and shells with gravelly sand. Due the existence of a
foundation of sandy material a plastic concrete wall of 80 cm
in thicken and a maximum of 22.5 m was built and the
sectors of plastic wall that did not reach the foundation was
injected (Verdugo and Peters, 2009).
During the construction of the embankment dam a bulldozer
operating in the river bed sank showing that the ground was
susceptible to liquefaction. A external evaluation of the
project
was
performed
and
the
recommended
countermeasures have included a berm with 13m high
confining the upstream shell and a battery of drainage
columns between the toe of the dam and the spillway was
installed.
During March 3, 1985 earthquake the dam exhibited an
extremely good behaviour with a maximum settlement of 10
cm. A possible explanation is that the low SPT zones.

Fig. 7. Mathanina Dam (New Zealand)
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Fig. 10. Cross section of Aromos dam (after Verdugo and
Peters, 2009)
are surrounded by stiffer zones that have reduced the
disturbance of loose zones.

Fig- 11. Embankment dam-cross sections

Lesson 8: Occurrence of liquefaction in a ground with
heterogeneous conditions requires a deeper analysis and a
better understanding of the interaction phenomena.
Tarbela dam with 143 m high built in Pakistan is an example
of a dam that was designed without consideration of
Darband fault which was revealed during the dam
construction. So the review design with the dam cross
sections showed in Fig. 11 has estimated a fault movement
of 1,0m to 1,5m and the core dam was constructed of self
healing material with a transition zone, a generous freeboard
and a wide chimney drain on the downstream. A general
view of the dam is shown in Fig. 12.
Tarbela dam was shaked by October 8, 2005 earthquake with
a 7.5 magnitude. The pore pressures and seepage rise was
observed in the dam right abutment. Relevant piezometers
and seepage points were continuously monitored to know the
trend which became normal after a few days.

Fig. 12. Tarbela dam –general view

Due to this event planning and installation of earthquake
monitoring and strong motion recording instrumentation for
dams and hydropower projects in northern areas of Pakistan
was implemented.
Preparation of seismic provisions for Building Code of
Pakistan which include revised seismic zoning map of
Pakistan
-Catalogue of Historical earthquakes of Pakistan.
-A catalogue of available fault plane solutions of
earthquakes in Pakistan.
Lesson 9: Dam behaviour during earthquakes contributes to
update and implement national codes.
Zipingpu dam 156 m high and 663,7 m long is one of the
largest CFRDs dam in China was built in 2006 and designed
for a peak ground acceleration of 0,26g (Chen, 2008). A dam
profile is shown in Fig. 13.
The dam was shaked during May 12, 2008 Wenchian
earthquake (magnitude 8.0) and is located 17 km of the
epicenter.
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Fig 13. Zipingpu dam profile (after Chen, 2008)
During the earthquake the reservoir was low with a volume
of 300 Mm 3, when under the normal conditions the
reservoir
volume is 1100Mm3. Due to this situation is difficult to
estimate the dam behaviour when the reservoir was full.
The crest of the dam and the concrete face were damaged.
during the earthquake (Figs 14 and 15).
The dam crest settled 715mm and had a horizontal deflection
of 180 mm.
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Fig.14 Zipingpu dam crest damages (after Chen, 2008)

Fig. 16 Epicentral location (black star), aftershocks and other
small events until January 16 (yellow circles). Main faults in
the region (in red) and location of Cariblanco and Toro
projects (after ICE, 2009)
Lesson 12: The current state of the art and state of practice
allow the design and construction of embankment dams that
exhibit a good performance record in regards of earthquake
shakes with less than 1% dam failures.
BACKGROUND OF EARTHQUAKE EMBANKMENT
DAM ENGINEERING HISTORY

Fig. 15. Zipingpu dam joint damages (after Chen, 2008)
From the six strong motions instruments only 3 located at
the crest were in good conditions at on the crest a peak
acceleration of 2g was recorded
Lesson 10: In spite the apparent good behavior of CFRD
dams during earthquakes there is still a lack of case histories
of CFRD operating with full reservoir.
Figure 16 shows the location of dams including the main
faults where strong motion records where obtained during
Costa Rica earthquake January 8, 2009 6.2 magnitude. In
this clear that Cariblanco and Toro projects are located very
near of the epicentral area, sites (ICE, 2009).
Cipreses dam of Cariblanco project has no accelerograph
installed, but is located very close (1.7 km) of the surge tank
instrument and has shown cracks.
Toro II project has exhibits longitudinal cracks in the crest.
Lesson 11: Dams located near faults can exhibit a good
behaviour for strong motions with only minor cracks.
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Pre-Historic (before 1940)–This period was characterized by
the development of historical earthquakes and
Paleoseismicity, the use of empirical methods, the
knowledge was primary and parcelled. The measurement of
the destructiveness of the earthquake was based in human
reaction and observed damage and use of Mercalli scale.
Investigation of the earthquake induced damage due to Great
San Francisco earthquake (1906) was performed by Sano
(1916). For the assessment of seismic behavior of
embankments dams Mononobe & Matsuo (1929) and Okabe
(1924) methods were proposed.
Classic Period (1940-1983) with the attempt to organize as
scientific discipline, records of typical earthquakes e.g. ElCentro earthquake (1940), the use of magnitude for the
physical measure of size of the earthquake and several scales
based on the amplitude of seismograph records. After
Niigata and Alaska earthquakes in 1964 the first studies of
liquefaction evaluation of sands and silty sands came out.
Use of geophysical tests namely refraction tests, up-hole and
downhole tests. Use of laboratory cyclic tests namely
reasonant column tests, simple shear tests and triaxial tests
for soil behavior and definition of shear modulus and
damping ratio. Developments of pseudo-static methods for
embankments (Ambraseys, 1960) and simplified methods for
assessment of displacements (Newmark, 1965, Sarma, 1975,
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Makdisi and Seed, 1977). Implementation of codes in total
stress SHAKE in 1971 and QUAD 4 in 1974.
Modern Period (1983-1995) characterized by the definition
of seismic action using strong ground motions parameters
PGA, PGV and PGD, response spectra and use of
deterministic and probabilistic methods. Development of
laboratory and field tests with more automation in operation,
more accurate measurements, reduced costs in maintenance
and production of data processing techniques with high
resolution and degree of reliability, use of seismic arrays and
SASW. Use of physical models e.g. shaking table, reaction
walls, centrifuge tests, calibration chambers and prototype
tests. Proposals for liquefaction assessment of dam materials
were presented. Developments of mathematical models for
dynamic analysis and codes in effective stress using
plasticity models e.g. DIANA, DYNAFLOW, TARA among
others. First stage of development of codes and standards.
Lessons from Mexico earthquake (1985), Loma Prieta
earthquake (1989) and Northridge earthquake (1994) were
taken into account.
Actual Period (after 1995) with the implementation of cyclic
triaxial tests and torsional shear tests. Combination of
laboratory and field tests to assess design parameters.
Development of more realistic coupled models, using
boundary elements and discrete elements, incorporating non
linear behavior, ageing, thermal effects and 3D analyses.
Verification, calibration and validation of computer
codes(ICOLD, 1993). Prediction of residual strength and
allowable deformation of soils exploring aerial photographs.
Implementation of instrumentation and monitoring to assess
seismic behavior of structures. Great emphasis on diffusion
of knowledge by journal, conferences, codes of practice and
development of networks. Use of case histories for a better
understanding of seismic behavior of embankment dams and
calibration of predictions (Sêco e Pinto, 2009b).
Developments of techniques for remediation and
rehabilitation of embankment dams.
SEISMIC DESIGN
Introduction
According to Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) in his book
Meteorologica earthquakes were produced by the dried
exhalations (spirits or winds) in caves inside the earth which
trying to escape make the earth shake
Martin Lister in England and Nicolas Lemery in France in
17th century were the first to propose that earthquakes were
produced by large explosions of inflammable material
formed by a combination of sulfur, coal, niter and other
products accumulated in the interior of earth (Udias and
Arroyo, 2005). The explosive theory was also proposed by
Newton`s Optics (1718) and the modern scientific ideas
consider the earthquake a natural phenomenon.

and earthquake was considered with optimism. Voltaire in
his novel Candide presented a hard attack to this optimistic
view point. Also Kant and Rosseau defended the optimist
position.
Selection of Design Earthquakes
The selection of seismic design parameters for dam projects
depends on the geologic and tectonic conditions at and in the
vicinity of the dam site (Sêco e Pinto, 2004).
The regional geologic study area should cover, as a
minimum, a 100 km radius around the site, but should be
extended to 300 km to include any major fault or specific
attenuation laws.
The probabilistic approach quantifies numerically the
contributions to seismic motion, at the dam site, of all
sources and magnitudes larger than 4 or 5 Richter scale and
includes the maximum magnitude on each source.
The dam should be designed for Design Earthquake (DE)
and Maximum Design Earthquake (MDE). Both depend on
the level of seismic activity, which is displayed at each fault
or tectonic province (Wieland, 2003).
For the OBE only minor damage is acceptable and is
determined by using probabilistic procedures (SRB, 1990).
For the MDE only deterministic approach was used
(ICOLD, 1983) but presently it is possible to use a
deterministic and probabilistic approach. If the deterministic
procedure is used, the return period of such an event is
ignored, if the probabilistic approach is used a very long
period is taken (ICOLD, 1989).
2 levels for seismic activity, namely MCE (Maximum
Credible Earthquake) considering a return period of 5001000 years and DBE (Design Basis Earthquake) for a return
period of 145 years, with a probability of exceeding in 100
years less than 50%, were proposed by ICOLD(1089).
ICOLD (2002) has considered 3 levels of seismic action,
namely: MDE (Maximum Design Earthquake), MCE
(Maximum Credible Earthquake) and OBE (Operating Basis
Earthquake). Four hazard classes were defined, namely: Low
with PGA<0,10g, Moderate with 0.10<PGA<0.25g, High
with PGA>0.25g (no active faults within 10 Km) and.
Extreme with PGA>0.25g (active faults within 10 Km).
In Eurocode 8 (1998a), in general, the hazard is described in
terms of a single parameter, i.e. the value ag of the effective
peak ground acceleration in rock or firm soil called “design
ground acceleration” expressed in terms of: a) the reference
seismic action associated with a probability of exceeding
(PNCR) of 10 % in 50 years; or b) a reference return period
(TNCR) = 475 years. The seismic action to be taken into
account for the “damage limitation requirement” has a
probability of exceedance, of 10% in 50 years and a return
period of 95 years (Seco e Pinto, 2009a).

In France the world was considered a good place in which
everything that happened was viewed to be “for the best”
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Tectonic Conditions
Within this framework the tectonic conditions should
include tectonic mechanisms, location and description of
faults (normal, stryke and reverse) and estimation of fault
activity (average slip rate, slip per event, time interval
between large earthquake, length, directivity effects, etc),
these factors are important to assess the involved risk.
The foundation properties for soil materials are estimated by
geophysical tests (crosshole tests, seismic downhole tests
and refraction tests), SPT tests, CPT tests, seismic cone and
pressurometer tests (ICOLD, 2005a).
Following (ICOLD, 1998) an active fault is a fault,
reasonably identified and located, known to have produced
historical fault movements or showing geologic evidence of
Holocene (11 000 years) displacements and which, because
of its present tectonic sitting, can undergo movements during
the anticipated life of man-made structures.
The current practice is the deterministic approach in which
the seismic evaluation parameters were ascertained by
identifying the critical active faults which show evidence of
movements in Quaternary time (ICOLD, 1998).
Dense recording GPS arrays with sampling rate allow
determining deformation rates in seismic active regions.
Intrinsic properties of rock at depth have to be obtained in situ
by deep drilling into active faults. Computational with high
resolution model for stress and deformations in communicating
fault systems should be developed. A better exploration of
microtremors technique, directivity effects and attenuation laws
is needed.

The new proposals integrate: (i) data of recent earthquakes;
(ii) corrections due the existence of fines; (iii) experience
related with a better interpretation of SPT test; (iv) local
effects; (v) cases histories related to more than 200
earthquakes; and (vi) Bayesian theory.
For liquefaction assessment by shear wave velocities two
methodologies are used: (i) methods combining the shear
wave velocities by laboratory tests on undisturbed samples
obtained by tube samplers or by frozen samples; (ii) methods
measuring shear wave velocities and its correlation with
liquefaction assessment by field observations.
It is important to refer that Eurocode 8 (1998b) considers no
risk of liquefaction when the ground acceleration is less than
0.15 in addition with one of the following conditions: (i)
sands with a clay content higher than 20 % and a plasticity
index > 10; (ii) sands with silt content higher than 10% and
N1 (60)>20; and (iii) clean sands with N1 (60)>25.
For post liquefaction strength relationships between SPT and
CPT tests and residual strength were proposed by several
authors.
Also to assess the settlement of the ground due to the
liquefaction of sand deposits there are some proposals based
on the knowledge of the safety factor against liquefaction
and the relative density converted to the value of N1.
The remedial measures against liquefaction can be classified
in two categories (TC4 ISSMGE, 2001; INA, 2001): (i) the
prevention of liquefaction; and (ii) the reduction of damage
to facilities due to liquefaction.

Surface fault breaking i.e. surface slip along an identified
fault zone under the dam is considered as the most
dangerous tectonic scenario for dam safety.

For the selection of the remedial measure it is important to
consider: (i) Potential efficiency; (ii) Technical feasibility;
(iii) Impact on structure and environmental; (iv) Costeffectiveness; and (v) Innovation (Sêco e Pinto, 2008).

With the tendency of less favourable dam sites these tectonic
conditions are getting increase attention.

More recently it is recognized that gravelly material can
liquefy.

The active tectonic movements result on fault breaks and in
creep movements. Also block movements have to be
considered in the near field of major faults.

The behavior of Keenleyside dam with foundation composed
of sands and gravel was investigated. Due many
uncertainties in the assessment multiple methods both field
tests (SPT tests, Becher Penetration tests, shear wave
velocities) and laboratory tests (triaxial and permeability
tests) were used (Yan & Lun, 2003).

Following Sherard et al. (1974) a concrete dam on active
faults or near major active faults is not advisable and if a site
with fault movements can not be avoided it is recommended
to build an embankment dam
Evaluation of the displacement that could occur along the
fault during the lifetime of the dam and the selection of the
design details to ensure safety against fault displacement are
still difficult problems to be solved (Wieland et al, 2008).

Performance Basis Design
The new trend for performance basis design is to consider 2
levels of seismic actions and to analyse the situation when
the limit of force balance is exceeded for high intensity
ground motions associated with a very rare seismic event
(Sêco e Pinto, 2009b).

Potentially Liquefiable Soils
Empirical liquefaction charts are given with seismic shear
wave velocities versus SPT values to assess liquefaction.
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For the design two basic requirements are defined: (i) Non
collapse requirement (ultimate limit states) i.e. after the
occurrence of the seismic event the structure shall retain its
structural integrity, with respect to both vertical and
horizontal loads, and adequate residual resistance, although

8

in some parts considerable damage may occur, (ii)
Minimization of damage (serviceability limit state) after
seismic actions with high probability of occurrence during
the design life of the structure some parts can undergo minor
damage without the need of immediate repair. The structure
shall be designed and constructed without the occurrence of
damage and the associated limitations of use, the costs of
which would be disproportionately high in comparison with
the costs of the structure itself(Towhata, 2008).
Acceptable level of damage in performance based design
shown in Table 1 are specified by a combination of
structural and operational damage (Iai, 2009).

New Zealand and UK have suggested a return period of 10
000 years for SEE for Extreme and High risk dams, 3000
years for Moderate risk and 1000 years for Low risk.
Experimental Models

Table 1. Acceptable level of damage in performance based
design

Japan E-Defense 3D Shaking table with 15m long 20m wide
with payload capacity of 1200 t0ons and with maximum
accelerations of 9 m/s2 is one of the largest facilities in the
world (Tokimatsu, 2007).

Acceptable level
of damage
Degree
I:
Serviceable
Degree
II.
Repairable
Degree III: Near
Collapse

Structural

Operational

Minor or no
damage
Controlled
damage
Extensive damage
in near collapse

Degree
Collapse

Complete loss of
structure

Little or no loss
of serviceability
Short term loss of
serviceability
Long term or
complete loss of
serviceability
Complete loss of
serviceability

IV

ANALYSIS
OF
EARTHQUAKES

DAM

STABILITY

DURING

Introduction
Principles are the fundamental of dam safety. The dam shall
safely retain the reservoir and any stored solids and pass
environmentally acceptable flows as required for all loading
conditions ranging from normal to extreme loads,
commensurate with the consequences of failure.
Practices and Procedures suggest methodologies that may be
used to meet the Principles.
Table 2 presents the seismic criteria probabilistic approach
recommended by Canada
Table 2. Seismic Criteria-Probabilistic approach
recommended by Canada
Consequence Class of
Dam
Low
Significant
High
Very High
Extreme
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EQ
Design
Ground
Motion
(EDGM-Mean
Annual
Exceedance Probability
1/500
1/1000
1/2500
1/5 000
1/10 000

Experimental methods are used to test predictive theories
and to verify mathematical models. Nevertheless some
limitations they are useful for physical modeling in
geotechnique.
The most popular techniques for embankment dams are
shaking table and centrifuge models.

2D shakers were installed in UC Davis and RPI geotechnical
centrifuges with robots.
A review of the existing testing facilities for earthquake
research in order to address new scientific topics in
earthquake engineering was performed by Taucer (2005).
Mathematical Models
The following dynamic analysis of embankment dams is
used (Sêco e Pinto et. al, 1993):
i) pseudo-static analyses;
ii) simplified procedures to assess deformations;
iii) dynamic analysis.
The pseudo-static analyses assume a rigid or elastic behavior
for the material (Ambraseys, 1960) and have the limitation
that the seismic coefficient acts in one direction for an
infinite time.
Simplified procedures to assess deformations were proposed
by Newmark (1965), Sarma (1975), Makdisi and Seed
(1977) and Bray (2007) and have given reasonable answers
in areas of low to medium seismicity.
Newmark´s original sliding block model considering only
the longitudinal component was extended to include the
lateral and vertical components of earthquake motion by
Elms (2000).
The use of dynamic pore pressure coefficients along with
limit equilibrium and sliding block approaches for
assessment of stability of earth structures during earthquakes
was demonstrated by Sarma and Chowdhury (1996).
For large dams where strong earthquakes have occurred
more sophisticated methods were used (Seed, 1980, ICOLD,
2001).
Several finite element computer programs assuming an
equivalent linear model in total stress have been developed for
1D –SHAKE code (Schanabel et. al., 1972), 2D –LUSH code
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(Idriss et. al., 1973; Lysmer et al., 1974) and pseudo 3D
TLUSH code (Lysmer et al., 1975).
Since these models are essentially elastic the permanent
deformations cannot be computed by this type of analysis and
are estimated from static and seismic stresses with the aid of
strain data from laboratory tests (cyclic triaxial tests or cyclic
simple shear tests) (Sêco e Pinto, 1993).
For embankment dams a value of 5% axial strain is used as
allowable deformation.
To overcome these limitations, nonlinear hysteretic models
with pore water pressure generation and dissipation have been
developed using incremental elastic or plasticity theory.
The incremental elastic models have assumed a nonlinear and
hysteretic behavior for soil and the unloading-reloading has
been modeled using the Masing criterion and incorporate the
effect of both transient and residual pore-water pressures
generated by seismic loading implemented in TARA 3 and
DESRA codes (Lee and Finn, 1978; Finn, 1987).
For the models based on the theory of plasticity two particular
formulations appear to have a great potential for
multidimensional analysis: the multi-yield surface model
implemented in DYNAFLOW code (Prevost, 1993) and the
two-surface model (Mröz et al., 1979).
A modified cam-clay model for cyclic loading taking into
account that when saturated clay is unloaded and then
reloaded the permanent strains occur earlier than predicted
by the cam-clay model was proposed by Carter et al. (1982).
The predictions exhibit many of the same trends that have
been observed in laboratory tests involving the repeated
loading of saturated clays.
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For the definition of the constitutive laws the following
laboratory tests are used for embankment dams: resonant
column tests, cyclic simple shear tests, cyclic triaxial tests
and cyclic torsional shear tests.
For medium embankment dams a conventional pseudo-static
analysis method is used to evaluate the seismic behavior of
dams (Ambraseys, 1960; Seed and Martin, 1966), but for
dams over 100m high a dynamic analysis including
computational analysis (modal analysis), model tests, field
measurements and prototype tests is recommended (ICOLD,
1975).
A flowchart that integrates stability analysis of dams,
monitoring and case histories is shown in Fig.17.
RESERVOIR TRIGGERED SEISMICITY
Man - made earthquakes caused by the filling of reservoirs
have drawn the attention of designers concerned with dam
safety(ICOLD, 2008a).
The reservoir triggered earthquake (RTS) is linked to dams
higher than about 100 m or to large reservoirs (capacity
greater than 500 x 106 m3), rate of reservoir filling and to
new dams of smaller size located in tectonically sensitive
areas. This means that the causative fault is already near to
failure conditions and so the added weight stresses and pore
pressures propagation due to reservoir impounding, can
trigger the seismic energy release.
The earthquakes that have occurred around the few dams by
mere accident cannot definitely be attributed to dam or water
load, which is insignificant, compared to the earth mass.
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Fig. 17. Flowchart for embankment dams
The detection of reservoir induced seismicity may be
performed in two phases (ICOLD, 1999): (i) phase 1
includes on historical seismicity and surveys of reservoir and
surrounding geological structures, aiming at identification of
possible active faults; and (ii) the second phase is carried out
starting at least one or two years prior to the impounding
with the installation of a permanent network of seismometers
and other measures such as precise levelling, use of
instrumentation to detect active fault movements, and
reservoir slope stability studies.
Seismological observations established at Bhakra, Pong and
Ramanga dams in the Hymalayan terrain have not registed
any increase in seismicity due to impounding of waters.
Table 3 presents some examples of dam sites where induced
earthquakes with magnitude higher than 5 in the Ritcher
scale have occurred (Sêco e Pinto, 2006).
The question of maximum magnitude to be ascribed to
reservoir triggered seismicity is difficult to clarify but it
seems in the range of 6 to 6.3.
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An interesting overall picture is shown in Fig. 18 taken from
USSD Report (1997)Monitoring the RTS activity is
recommended for large dams and reservoirs. In order to
distinguish between background seismicity and RTS
monitoring before impounding is recommended. For
obtained reliable epicentral locations and hypocentral depths,
a local array of stations is required (ICOLD, 2005b).
The International Symposium on Reservoir Induced
Seismicity 95 held in Beijing, China, referred to 120 RIS
cases from 29 countries with 22 in China, 18 in USA and 12
in India.
Most of the existing reservoirs are aseismic, i.e. no
correlation with triggering.
Out of the existing 45000 dams and reservoirs for only 120 a
correlation has been reported with a relevant seismic event.
The seismic phenomena are taking place in the brittle and
fractured part of the earth crust in which water is circulating
and that such phenomena are spent in the underlying plastic
mass.
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Table 3 - Examples of dams with induced seismicity

DAM

Country

Induced
seismicity
M

year

Prio
r
seismici
ty

1930

5

1938

mo
derate

archgravity

221

36703

1936

5

1939

---

Zimbab
we/
Zambia

arch

128

160368

1959

5,8

1963

low

China

buttress

105

10500

1959

6,1

1962

Índia

gravity
embank
ment
embank
ment
embank
ment
embank
ment
embank
ment
embank
ment
embank
ment
embank
ment

103

2708

1964

6,5

1967

165

4750

1965

6,3

1966

96

1000

1969

6,3

236

4298

1967

5,7

1975

330

11000

1972

5

1977

143

14300

1974

5,8

1996

111

163000

1974

5.3

1981

112

2244

1974

6.7

1995
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640

1961

Hoover

U.S.A.
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Greece
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Constantine

Greece
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U.S.A.

Nurek

Tajikista
n

Tarbella

Pakistan

Aswan

Egypt
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n

Greece
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Greece
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Year
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(m)
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smic
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Fig.18. Scattergraph of RTS cases (after USSD, 1997)
The difference between a reservoir triggered earthquake and
a natural earthquake is that the reservoir triggered
earthquake has a relatively high likelihood of occurring
within the first few years after the filling of the reservoir or
when the reservoir reaches the maximum level.
These earthquakes have a shallow focus and their epicentres
are closed to the dam sites or reservoirs.
MONITORING AND INSPECTIONS
.
The detailed definition of the monitoring scheme cannot be
made on the solid basis of the features of the dam, because
many external factors are to be taken into account when
safety problems are considered.
The risk factors are classified in three classes, which are
referred respectively to actions, to the structure or to values
affected by hazards. The arithmetic average of all indices
falling in a given class forms an overall risk factor for the
class; in this way we define, respectively, an environmental
factor E, a reliability factor F, a potential human/economic
hazard factor R. Lastly a global risk index ag, is developed
by
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taking the product of the three partially factors E, F, R,
(ICOLD, 1981).
Experience has shown that the rational and systematic
control of dam safety should consist of several tasks:
- frequent visual inspection by staff in charge of the
observation system;
- periodic visual inspection by specialist;
- regular instrumentation measurements;
- data validation;
- data storage;
- visual inspections;
- safety evaluation;
- corrective actions.
Visual inspections are compulsory after exceptional
occurrences, such as important earthquakes, big floods and
total or nearly total drawdowns of the reservoir (ICOLD,
1988; Sêco e Pinto, 1993).
There are two steps in performing dam inspection: i) an
immediate inspection by the dam operator; (ii) follow-up
inspection by dam engineering professional (ICOLD,
2008b).
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During inspections the following aspects deserve attention:
Dam Body - (i) upstream face (slope protection, vegetative
growth, settlement, debris, burrows and unusual conditions);
(ii) downstream face (signs of movement, seepage or wet
areas, vegetative growth, condition of slope protection,
burrows or unusual conditions); (iii) crest (surface cracking,
settlement, lateral movement, camber).
Spillway – (i) approach channel (vegetation, debris,
slides, slope protection); (ii) control structures (apron, crest,
walls, gates, bridge, chute, stilling basin, outlet channel).
Outlet Works – (i) inlet works, emergency control
facility, outlet conduit, service control facility, stilling basin.
Reservoir - Log Boom, landslides, other.
Access Road - Condition of pavement, ditches, bridge.
If an earthquake of moderate or high Richter magnitude occurs
an immediate inspection of the dam shall be done following
these procedures (ICOLD, 1988):
1)
If the dam is damaged to the extent that there is
increased or new flow passing downstream immediately implement failure or impending failure procedures as previously planned.
2)
If abnormally reduced flow is present at the upstream
end of the storage, immediately inspect the river
course for possibility of upstream damages due to
landslide. If such is the case, implement failure or
impending failure procedures.
3)
Make an estimate of the characteristics of the
earthquake.
4)
Immediately conduct a general overall visual inspection of the dam.
5)
If visible damage has occurred but has not been
serious enough to cause failure of the dam, quickly
observe the nature, location and extent of damage and
report all the information to the supervisory office for
a decision on further actions.
6)
Make additional inspections at any time because of
possible aftershocks.
7)
During inspection the following aspects deserve
attention: (i) cracks, settlements and seepage located
on abutments or faces of the dam; (ii) drains and seeps
for increased flow or stoppage of flow; (iii) outlet
works or gate misalignment; (iv) visible reservoir and
downstream areas for landslides, new springs and
sandboils and rockfalls around the reservoir and in
downstream areas; (v) for tunnels and conduits,
observe whether silt, sand, gravel, rock or concrete
fragments are being carried in the discharge stream.
8)
Continue to inspect and monitor the facilities for at
least 48 hours after the earthquake because delayed
damage may occur.
9)
A secondary inspection 2 weeks to a month after the
initial inspection should be made.
10)
A schedule of very frequent readings should be
followed for at least 48 hours after the earthquake.
11)
If failure is imminent, warning to downstream
residents is essential. All measures should be used
to reduce storage in the reservoir.
Sketches, photographs, videos, may help to describe the
nature and extent of any damage.
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If an earthquake is observed at or near a dam with a Ritcher
magnitude greater than and within a radial distance shown in
Table 4 immediately conduct a general overall inspection of
the dam and major appurtenant structures.
Table 4-Reccommended inspections based in magnitude
versus distance
Magnitude
>4,0

Distance (Km)
25

>5,0
>6,0
>7,0
>8,0

50
80
125
200

If the dam is damaged with increased new flow passing
downstream or there are signs of imminent failure
immediately implement Emergency Action Plan.
Following Australia dam guidelines for all dams that have
experienced a MMI of 4 or greater the response required has
adopted the guidelines of Table 5.
Table 5 (ICOLD, 2008b)
Response
Level
A

Likely
Impact
<MMI 4

B
C
D
E

MMI 4
MMI 5
MMI 6
MMI 7 or
greater

Response Required
Inspect dam at next routine
inspection
Inspect dam within 18 hours
Inspect dam within 6 hours
Inspect dam immediately
Inspect dam immediately

Related earthquakes alarm systems, shake maps are
generated automatically.
AGEING EFFECTS
Ageing is defined as a class of deterioration associated with
time-related changes in the properties of the materials of
which the structure and its foundation are constructed in
normal conditions. And so these deteriorations occur more
that 5 years after the beginning of operation (ICOLD,
1993a).
Inspection, testing and monitoring of the works are the
methods used to obtain the knowledge required to exercise
control. A direct evaluation of ageing is possible by
monitoring changes in structural properties, and indirect
evaluation is available by monitoring the effects and
consequences of these changes and of the actions causing
them.
Piping in the foundation and in the body of fill dams has
caused a number of failures.
The progress in safety of dams is due the improvements of
design and construction, but possibly even more to
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maintenance and monitoring and in particular to proper
visual inspections and careful follow-up of increases in
leakage that have prevented many failures and reduced the
consequences of others.

It is considered that grout curtain in the rock foundation is
not vulnerable to earthquakes. Dynamic soil-structure
interaction, joint movements and fissures in the dam
foundation due earthquakes can provoke local damages in
grout curtain and additional grouting works are necessary to
rehabilitate foundation drainage system (Wieland, 2005).

REHABILITATION OF DAMS
Due to ageing effects and retrofit of dams this topic is getting
an increasing attention.
Anastassopoulos et al. (2004) describe the behavior of
Thissavros rockfil dam, with 172m high and 480m long,
constructed in Greece. The bedrock is composed by gneiss,
partially schistose, granitic gneiss and layers of mica schist.

It is well accepted that due limited resources available to
face maintenance of old dams there is a need to develop a
rational plan for rehabilitation based on trough scientific
research. There is a need to increase research and
development for abetter effectiveness and efficiency of the
investment in maintenance and safety of dams.
RISK ANALYSES

Based on morphological criteria the project assumed the
existence of several large dormant landslides at the dam site.
Two areas of instability developed at the site: (i) right bank
slide where a monitoring system composed by inclinometers,
piezometers and survey monuments was installed to assess
the remedial measures that have included major excavation,
removing of unstable mass, toe buttressing and drainage by a
system of galleries; and (ii) left bank where jet grouting and
toe load berm were used.
Perlea et al. (2004) conducted numerous seismic retrofit
solutions to reinforce the strength of a liquefiable sand
deposit in the foundation of a major embankment dam with
42 m high and 1650m long.
The following methods of foundation soil stabilization were
evaluated: (i) removal and replacement of liquefiable
material; (ii) dynamic compaction (heavy tamping); (iii)
densification by vibrocompaction; (iv) compaction grouting;
(v) jet-grouting; (vi) soil mixing, (vii) densification by stone
columns; (viii) gravel drains; (ix) enlargement embankment;
and (x) foundation seepage cutoff.
The authors have considered that the best alternative solution
for stabilization of the upstream slope was jet grouting from
a platform built on the lower portion of the slope and for
stabilization of the downstream slope was deep soil mixing.
The use of geomembranes for the rehabilitation of dams is a
topic of great interest. Following ICOLD (1991) more that 70
dams located in 24 countries have used geomembranes.
The causes of dam deterioration are related with irregular
settlement of the fill or foundation, poor concrete quality and
shrinkage cracks.
The following agents are related with the dangers to which
the geomembranes are exposed:
-falling rock at mountain site
-blows from heavy floating objects
-ultraviolet radiations
-willful damage.
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The findings of dam failures statistical analysis of data show
that (ICOLD, 1995):
(i) the percentage of failure of large dams has been
falling over the last four decades, 2,20 % of dams built
before 1950 failed, failures of dams built since 1951 are
less than 0.5 %;
(ii) most failures involve newly built dams. The
greatest proportion 70% of failures occur in the first ten
years and more especially in the first year after
commission.
At the end of XX century, one billion people was living
downstream of dams. It seems that millions may be at risk
within the next 50 years as a result of dam failures. Although
the annual failure probability of dams is lower than 10-6 in
most cases, it may be higher for dams in seismic areas
subject to sudden failures such as tailing dams and hydraulic
fill dams.
The potential risk associated with dams consists of structural
components and socio-economic components. The structural
components of potential risk depend mostly on storage
capacity and on the height of the dam, as the potential
downstream consequences are proportional to the mentioned
values (ICOLD, 1989). Socio-economic risks can be
expressed by a number of persons who need to be evacuated
in case of danger and by potential downstream damage.
The structures following EC8 are classified in 4 importance
categories related with the size, value and importance for the
public and on the possibility of human losses in case of
collapse. To each important category an important factor is
assigned. The important factor γf =1.0 is associated with a
design seismic event having a reference return period of 475
years. The importance category varying I to IV (with the
decreasing of the importance and complexity of the
structure) are related with the importance factor γf assuming
the values 1.4, 1.2, 1.0 and 0.8, respectively.
Risk management comprises the estimation of the level of
risk and exercising adequate control measures to reduce the
risk when the level is not tolerable (Caldeira et al, 2005).
The essence of risk management and the role of quantitative
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risk assessment (QRA) within the context of risk
management are shown in Fig. 19 (Ho et al., 2000).
ICOLD has introduced the potential risk of dam associated
with capacity, height, evacuation requirements and potential
downstream damage considering these 4 hazard classes
(ICOLD, 2009).
Tables 6 and 7 are convenient to define risk associated with
dams. Four risk factors are separately weighted as low,
moderate, high or extreme.
Table 6. Risk Factor (ICOLD, 2009)
Risk Factor

Extreme

High

Capacity
(hm3)
Height (m)

>120
(6)
>45
(6)
>1000
(12)

120-1
(4)
45-30
(4)
1000-100
(8)

High
(12)

Moderate
(8)

Evacuation
Require
ments
Potential
Downstream
Damage

Modera
te
1-0-1
(2)
30-15
(2)

Low

Low
(4)

None
(0)

<0.1
(0)
<15
(0)
None
(0)

The weighting points of each of the four risk factors, shown
in brackets in Table 6 are summed to provide the Total Risk
Factor as
Total Risk Factor= Risk Factor (capacity)
+ Risk Factor (height)
+ Risk Factor (evacuation requirements)
+ Risk Factor (potential downstream damaged).
The link between the Total Risk Factor and Risk Class is
giving in Table 7.
Table 7. Risk Class (ICOLD, 2009)
Total Risk Factor
0-6
7-18
19-30
31-36

Risk Class
I(Low)
II(Moderate)
III(High)
IV(Extreme)

There is a rich discussion related Failure Modes and Effect
Analysis (FMEA), Failure Mode, Effects and Critically
Analysis (FMECA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Fault Tree
analysis (FTA) (ICOLD, 2005b).
Structural Reliability Methods permit the calculation of
failure probabilities of the mechanisms. Probabilities are
calculated using the methods of the modern reliability theory
such as Level III Monte Carlo, Bayesian theory, Level II
advanced first order second moment calculations.
Dam owners, regulatory authorities and consultants have
been carrying out risk analyses for many years. Its purpose is
to identify the main real risks associated with each type and
height of dam for all circumstances and can be conducted: (i)
in extensive risk analysis of very large dams, to substantiate
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Fig. 19. Framework for risk management (after Ho et al,
2000)
reliably the probabilities chosen in fault trees using Monte
Carlo simulation technique; (ii) in simplified risk analysis of
smaller dams, to focus low-cost risk analysis on a few main
risks; (iii) and in identifying possibilities for reducing these
risks through low-cost structural or non-structural measures
(Lempérière, 1999).
The main components of risk management are risk
assessment (risk analysis and risk evaluation), risk
mitigation and control (risk reduction, emergency actions)
and decision (Seco e Pinto, 2002).
Consideration of human behavior is essential when assessing
the consequence of failures: well organized emergency
planning and early warning systems could decrease the
number of victims and so the study of human behavior plays
an important role in assessment of risk analysis (Sêco e
Pinto, 1993).
We should never forget the contribution of Voltaire and the
book Candide published in 1759, after the Lisbon earthquake
(1755), for the change from the intellectual optimism and
potential fatalism that is a necessary condition for the
construction of future scenarios in a risk analysis context.
The results of a risk analysis can be used to guide future
investigations and studies, and to supplement conventional
analyses in making decisions on dam safety improvements.
Increasing confidence in the results of risk analyses can lead
to a better cost-effective design and construction, satisfy our
personal needs providing a better insight of the different
factors of the design and give more confident to our
decisions (Sêco e Pinto, 2002).
A probabilistic risk assessment addresses three fundamental
questions (Salmon and Hartford, 1995): (I) what can go
wrong? (ii) how likely is it?; (iii) what damage will it do?
In general, a society risk of 0.001 lives per year per dam
appears to be acceptable. Assuming that the combined
probability of failure to a PMF and MCE is approximately
1/100 000 per year, a loss of life of up to 100 people would
result in an acceptable risk of 0.001 lives per year per dam.
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The past practices of US Army Corps of Engineers, US
Bureau of Reclamation and BC Hydro are shown in Fig. 20
along with a risk line of 0.001 (or 10-3) lives per year per
dam (Salmon and Hartford, 1995).
There are several uncertainties in seismic hazard and seismic
input in material properties, in structural modelling, in
dynamic analysis and in performance criteria.
Due to large uncertainties in predicting the seismic
behaviour of dams it is recommended to increase the
resilience to earthquake loading instead reducing the
uncertainties in seismic hazard, or material properties or
using more sophisticated methods of seismic analysis.
First order methods such as the First Order Second Moment
(FOMS) and the First Order Reliability Method (FORM)
have received significant exposure (e.g. Low, 1997; Nadim,
2002; Duncan, 2000) in recent years as relatively simple
methods for estimating the probability of events occurring in
geotechnical analysis.
The basic objective is as follow: given statistical data (mean
and standard deviation) for key geotechnical input
parameters (e.g. strength parameters c` and tan, seepage
parameters k, settlement parameters E) what are the statistics
(mean and standard deviation) of the key output quantities
(e.g. factor of safety FS, flow rate Q, settlement d).

Fig. 20. Incremental hazard criteria (after Salmon and
Hartford, 1995
input and output parameters, they are based on an underlying
assumption of a Taylor Series truncated after the linear
terms-hence first order.
A fully probabilistic assessment of sliding displacement
incorporating the aleatory variability in the earthquake
ground motion prediction was proposed by Rathje and
Saygili (2008). The product of this analysis is a displacement
hazard curve which provides the annual rate of exceedance
for a range of displacement levels. The different
deterministic and probabilistic methodologies to predict the
siding displacement of a slope are shown in Fig. 21.
Warning Systems
For warning systems there two possibilities approaches:
direct and indirect monitoring.
For example in the direct approach a potential sliding area is
monitored by simple displacement instrumentation and when
a predicted threshold value of displacement is exceeded the
people of the valley is evacuated.

In the case of the output parameter, if these statistics are
combined with an assumed probability density function, the
probability of events such as slope failure, excessive flow
rates, excessive settlements, etc, can be estimated.
While these methods are relatively easy to implement and
give useful qualitative and sensitivity information about the

Fig. 21. A fully probabilistic assessment of sliding
displacement (after Rathje and Saygili, 2008)
An example of indirect warning system is the city of Hong
Kong where an early warning system has been used for over
15 years and people were educated to recognize report
Paper No. SOAP 2
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landslide symptoms (cracking, reactivation of spring lines,
surface runoff, etc).
The possible avenues for warming systems are shown in Fig.
22.
BC Hydro dam safety program has five basic components:
surveillance, emergency preparedness planning, dam safety
reviews, deficiency investigations and capital improvements
(Stewart, 2000).
Past practice has been to require relatively large increases in
reliability (decreases in probability of failure) when the
consequences exceed some fixed criteria such as one
expected fatality or six expected fatalities.
Fig 23 shows the risk analysis proposed by AGS (2000).
BENEFITS AND CONCERNS OF DAMS
The benefits of dams are demonstrated with the
multipurpose uses of dams for water supply, irrigated
agriculture, electric energy generation, flood control,
recreation and other usages.
Importance to the environmental and social aspects of dams
and reservoir is increasing. Construction of dams is no
longer acceptable without a careful analysis of mitigation
and adverse impacts. It is important to build dams in
harmony with the environment and therefore economic
development and environmental protection must proceed
hand in hand.
Social and economic impacts of large dam projects vary
greatly in different geographic, political, and economy
contexts (ICOLD, 1992). Social and economic
considerations must be brought into the planning process
early to permit major process layout and design elements.
In the Stockholm Conference on World Environmental held
in 1972, hunger and poverty were identified as the major

reasons for environmental degradation. Inadequate and
uneven distribution of rainfall, drought and floods, lower
irrigation intensity and instability of agricultural, poor health
status are all factors contributing to hunger and poverty.
One of the predominant concerns about reservoirs is resettlement. Following ICOLD (1997) involuntary settlement
must be handled with special care, managerial skill and
political concern based on comprehensive social research
and sound planning for implementation.
The implementation of resettlement planning needs to take
into account: (i) opinion surveys and talks to people about
resettlement rights; (ii) identification of entitled families; (iii)
site selection; (iv) allocation of funds, (v) preparation of
agricultural land; (vi) road construction, provision of water
supply and other infrastructure; (vii) tendering of bids for
resettlement housing construction; (viii) transportation of
settlers, (ix) training and agricultural extension services; and
(x) rehabilitation programs.
A study carried out in respect of a number of major dams
built for multipurpose projects indicates that the population
displaced on account of construction of dams varies between
0,5% to 4% of the population benefited by the irrigation
facilities and a tiny fraction of the percentage of those
benefited by electricity (Naidu, 1999). The rate of
beneficiaries to affected persons is better than 200:1.
Statistical analysis of a number of major projects also
indicates that forest area submerged is just 1-2% of the area
to be irrigated by those projects.
A detailed listening of over 80 potential impacts on the
natural re-environment (flora, fauna and aquatic fauna),
social economic and cultural aspects, land, dam construction
activities, sedimentation of reservoirs, downstream
hydrology, water quality, tidal barrages, climate and human
health was presented by Veltrop (1998).
Technical feasibility and economic justification of new dam
projects are now second to social, political and
environmental considerations and requires cooperation
among engineers, scientists, environmentalists and
stakeholders.
NEW CHALLENGES- LESSONS FOR TOMORROW
The following topics deserve more consideration and can be
considered new challenges for a better understanding of
seismic embankment dams behaviour:
Liquefaction

Fig. 22 Possible avenues for warning systems
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i) The use of Becker hammer and geophysical tests to assess
the liquefaction of gravelly materials; ii) Determination of
residual strength of soil; iii) Evaluation of liquefaction
consequences and post earthquakes displacements; iv)
Mitigation methods with use of microorganisms.
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Embankment Dams
(i) Coupled models with non linear analyses and pore water
pressure generation and dissipation models; (ii)
Hydrodynamic effects of reservoir associated with dynamic

foundation-structure interaction (Seco e Pinto, 2001); (iii)
Failure of tailing dams that currently reach more than 200m
high and reservoirs with more than one billion tons of slimes
.

Fig. 23. Risk analysis proposed by AGS (2000)
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due the occurrence of liquefaction and the increase of the
resistance due to ageing effects of the deposits.
Lessons for Tomorrow
Today there is a need to work in large teams exploring the
huge capacity of computers to analyze the behavior of large
dams. Innovative methods and new solutions require high
reliable information and teams integrating different experts,
namely seismologists, geologist, geophysics, geotechnicians
and structures engineers.
.
A joint effort between Owners, Decision-Makers,
Researchers, Consultants, Professors, Contractors and
General Public to face this challenge is needed.
It is important to understand the concepts of vulnerability
and resilience. Vulnerability is associated with two
dimensions, one is the degree of loss or the potential loss and
the second integrates the range of opportunities that people
face in recovery. This concept received a great attention
from Rousseau and Kant (1756). Resilience is a measure of
the system`s capacity to absorb recover from a hazardous
event. Includes the speed in which a system returns to its
original state following a perturbation. The capacity and
opportunity to recolate or to change are also key dimensions
of disaster resilience. The purpose of assessing resilience is
to understand how a disaster can disturb a social system and
the factors that can disturb the recovery and to improve it.

Also it is important to narrow the gap between the university
education and the professional practice, but we should not
forget that Theory without Practice is a Waste, but Practice
without Theory is a Trap. Kant has stated that Nothing better
that a good theory, but following Seneca Long is the way
through the courses, but short through the example. I will
add through a careful analysis of Case Histories.
Within this framework all the essential steps of good dam
analyses, whatever the type of material is involved shall be
performed with a sufficient degree of accuracy that the overall
results can be extremely useful in guiding the engineer in the
final assessment of seismic stability. This final assessment is
not made by numerical results but shall be made by experienced
engineers who are familiar with the difficulties in defining the
design earthquake and the material characteristics, who are
familiar with the strengths and limitations of analytical
procedures, and who have the necessary experience gained
from studies of past performance
In dealing with these topics we should never forget the
memorable lines of Hippocrates:
-

“The art is long
-and life is short
experience is fallacious
-and decision is difficult”.
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ANNEX 1
Table A1 - Behaviour of embankment dams during earthquakes
Dam

Country

Baihé

China

960 60

Cogoti

Chile

159 84

1939

Douhe

China

6000 22

1970

El Caracol

México

126

1985

El Infiernillo

México

350 148

1963

Gokçe

Turkey

50

Kuzuryu

Japan

355 128

1964

La
Marquesa

Chile

220 10

1943

La Villita

México

420 60

1968

Leyroy
Anderson

U.S.A.

370 72

1950

Long Valley

U.S.A.

200 60

1941

Mahio

Japan

106

1961
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L(m) H Construc
(m) tion
Year

Dam
characteristics
Zoned with sandy
gravel materials
and slope clay
core
Rockfill with
upstream concrete
membrane
Homogeneous

Construction
Technique

Earthquake
characteristics
Tangshan
1976

Dam behaviour

Reference

Slope of the upstream Wenshao
shell
(1987)

I= 6
Illapel
Crest settlements Cook (1984)
1943
0.38 m
Seed et al.
M= 8.3
(1978)
Longitudinal cracks Liu et al.
Tangshan
(1979)
crest settlement due
1976
Shen et al.
foundation
I= 6
(1981)
liquefaction
horiz. accel.
0.4 g
Ulloa
Zoned with
Compacted fill
1985
Transverse and
(1987)
rockfill shells and
Earthquake
longitudinal
clay core
September 19
deformations,
M= 8.1
crest settlement 160
mm
Dumped
rockfill

Zoned with
Compacted fill 1979 and 1981 Longitudinal cracks
Tamura
rockfill shells and
Earthquakes
0.60 m depth
(1986)
clay core
M=7.6
Resendiz et
al.
(1982)
August 17,
1999, M= 7.4
Zoned with
Compacted fill
1969
Nose and
rockfill shells and
Earthquake
Baba
sloping clay core
M= 6.6
(1980)
Retamal et
Upstream and
1985
Zoned with silty Compacted fill
al. (1989)
downstream shells
Earthquake
shells and
85-88%
slopes. Liquefaction
March 3
impervious core
Modified
of sandy material
M= 7.8
Proctor
Tamura
Zoned with
1979 and 1981 Longitudinal cracks
rockfill shells and
Earthquakes with 150 m length and (1986)
0.50 m depth
Resendiz et
central clay core
M= 7.1-7.6
al. (1982)
amax= 0.31 0.38g
Morgan Hill Longitudinal cracks
Gazetas
Zoned with
Compacted
1984
with 300 m length and (1987)
rockfill shells and core rockfill
2 m depth
impervious core shells without amax= 0.42g
compaction
Seed (1980)
Springs on
1980
Homogeneous Compacted fill
downstream toe, Lai and Seed
with silty sand 93% modified Earthquake
cracks
AASHO
May 27
material with
(1985)
M= 6
gravels
Settlements of
Yonezawa
Nagano
Zoned with
Compacted
upstream shell
et al. (1987)
Prefecture
rockfill shells and core rockfill
central core
shells without September 14
1984
compaction
M= 6.8
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Malpaso

Peru

152 78

1936

Matahina New Zeland 400 86

Ambraseys
Crest settlement
1938
(1960)
(76 mm) and
Earthquake
downstream
October 10
displacements 51 mm
I= 6.6
Mercalli
modified scale
de Mercalli
Zoned with
Compacted fill
1987
Upstream shell has Matsumoto
et al.
rockfill shells and
Earthquake
settled 800 mm,
(1985)
impervious core
March 2
downstream shell has
Gillon
M=6.3
settled 100 mm with
(1988)
250 mm tilting for
downstream
Settlement of 30 mm Nose and
Rockfill
Compacted fill
1961
displacement for Baba (1980)
Earthquake
downstream of 50 mm
M= 7.2
acceleration=
0.25g

Rockfill with
upstream concrete
membrane

Dumped
rockfill

Dumped
rockfill

Miboro

Japan

405 131

1960

Minase

Japan

665 ---

1964

Rockfill with
upstream concrete
membrane

Oroville

U.S.A.

1707 235

1968

S. Fernando

U.S.A.

664

1940

Leyroy
Anderson

U.S.A.

370 72

1950

Zoned with gravel
shells and slope
core
Homogeneous
with sandy silty
and clay sandy
materials
Zoned with
rockfill shells and
impervious core

Long Valley

U.S.A.

200 60

1941

Mahio

Japan

106

1961

Malpaso

Peru

152 78

1936

Matahina New Zeland 400 86

Miboro

Japan
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405 131

1960

Niigata 1964
M= 7.5

Compacted fill Oroville 1975
M= 5.7
Hydraulic fill

Compacted
core rockfill
shells without
compaction
Compacted fill
93% modified
AASHO

S. Fernando
Fev. 9 1971
M= 6.6

Damages of the
Matsumoto
membrane joints, et al. (1985)
cracks on the crest,
increase of seepage
Crest settlements
Banerjee et
9 mm
al. (1979)
Longitudinal cracks
Liquefaction

Seed et al.
(1973)
ICOLD
(1975)
Morgan Hill Longitudinal cracks
Gazetas
1984
with 300 m length and (1987)
amax= 0.42g
2 m depth

Seed (1980)
Springs on
1980
Homogeneous
downstream toe, Lai and Seed
Earthquake
with silty sand
cracks
May 27
material with
(1985)
M= 6
gravels
Settlements of
Yonezawa
Zoned with
Compacted
Nagano
upstream shell
et al.
rockfill shells and core rockfill
Prefecture
(1987)
central core
shells without September 14
compaction
1984
M= 6.8
Ambraseys
Crest settlement
Rockfill with
Dumped
1938
(1960)
(76 mm) and
upstream concrete
rockfill
Earthquake
downstream
membrane
October 10
displacements 51 mm
I= 6.6
Mercalli
modified scale
de Mercalli
Zoned with
Compacted fill
1987
Upstream shell has Matsumoto
rockfill shells and
Earthquake
settled 800 mm,
et al.
impervious core
March 2
downstream shell has
(1985)
M=6.3
settled 100 mm with
Gillon
250 mm tilting for
(1988)
downstream
Settlement of 30 mm Nose and
Rockfill
Compacted fill
1961
displacement for Baba (1980)
Earthquake
downstream of 50 mm
M= 7.2
acceleration=
0.25g
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Sheffield

U.S.A. 220

1923

Homogeneous
with silty sand
and upstream
concrete
membrane

Compacted
fill

Santa
Barbara
June 19
1925
M= 6.3

1976

Zoned with
rockfill shells and
central clay core
material

Compacted
fill

MiyagiKen-Oki
1978
M= 7.4

.5

Tarumizu

Japan

256
3

Vidra

Romania
23

Wangwu

China

761
0

H - dam height

Paper No. SOAP 2

L - dam length

Vrancea
March 4,
1977
M=7.2
ah= 0.2g

Zoned with
rockfill shells and
central clay core
material
Zoned with
sandy shells and
clay core
I - earthquake intensity

Dumped
fill

Bohai Wan
1969
I= 6

Dam failure

Seed et al.
(1969)

YanagisNo apparent
damages Calculated awa and
crest acceleration Fukui
(1980)
0.36g
No apparent
cracks

Liquefaction and
slope of upstream
shell

Priscu
(1979)

Wenshao
(1987)

M - earthquake magnitude
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